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ABSTRACT
A fundamental problem entrepreneurs face in the formative stages of their businesses is how to
provide incentives for employees to protect, rather than  steal, the source of organizational rents. We study
how the entrepreneur's response to this problem will determine the organization's internal structure, growth,
and its eventual size. In particular, our model suggests large, steep hierarchies will predominate in physical
capital intensive industries, and these will typically have seniority-based promotion policies. By contrast,
flat hierarchies will be seen in human capital intensive industries. These will have up-or-out promotion
systems, where experienced managers either become owners or are fired. Furthermore, flat hierarchies will
have  more  distinctive  technologies  or  cultures than steep hierarchies. The model points to some
essential differences between organized hierarchies and markets.
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http://gsblgz.uchicago.eduAt the root of most enterprises generating economic surplus is an entrepreneur with an unique
critical resource such as an idea, good customer relationships, a new tool, or superior management
technique. A fundamental problem of entrepreneurship is how to enlist the co-operation of the
many agents necessary for production without ceding to them too much of the surplus generated
by the enterprise. The risk of being expropriated is, however, always inherent in production. In
particular, the entrepreneur has to give her employees (whom we call managers) close proximity
or access to the critical resource for them to learn to produce eectively. For example, a manager
has to understand the idea, be in contact with the key customers and suppliers, or even learn
the entrepreneur's unique managerial techniques, in order to work eectively. But access also
gives the manager the opportunity to expropriate this critical resource and compete against the
entrepreneur. Managers may steal the idea, walk away with clients, or mimic the entrepreneur's
management style, and start up a rival concern. The greater the access a manager has, the more
he can appropriate, and the more eectively he can compete. This paper explores the role of
organizational design in dealing with the problem of expropriation, and derives implications for
the shape, size, and growth of organizations.1
Although it is intended to serve as a metaphor for all those activities that allow managers
to appropriate part of the value of the rm, the particular phenomenon we have in mind is not
unimportant. Intel, the microprocessor manufacturer, was started, not in a garage or basement
as many other Silicon Valley start-ups, but when Robert Noyce, the General Manager of Fairchild
Semiconductor, and Gordon Moore, its head of Research and Development walked out of Fairchild
and set up their own rm, Integrated Electronics. Shortly before their departure, a scientist in
Moore's department had discovered the \silicon-gate" technique to produce semi-conductor memory
devices. This became an important part of Intel's proposed product line. As a former employee of
both companies put it \Intel was founded to steal the silicon gate process from Fairchild." [Jackson
11997, p26-27]. Clearly, of all Fairchild's employees, Noyce and Moore had the greatest access
to Fairchild's inventions, and at the very least, took a lot of knowledge and, equally important,
employees with them to the start-up. Thus Intel hit the ground running, and is now one of the
most protable rms while Fairchild Semiconductor is virtually a footnote in business history. The
circumstances of Intel's founding are not an exception. Bhide [2000, p.94] reports that 71% of the
rms included in the Inc 500 (a list of young, fast growing rms) were founded by people who
replicated or modied an idea encountered in their previous employment. The phenomenon has
also been important in the past. Many during the Industrial Revolution, including Arkwright who
\invented" the water frame, appropriated rather than discovered the technological advances their
names are associated with (Hall [1998, p. 310-347]).
A simple example will help clarify the basic trade-o. Consider a master watchmaker in a
small town who has a more productive technology to make watches. The watchmaker would like
to produce with as many managers as possible. For now, there are two candidates for employment,
Ram and Pietro. The watchmaker knows that Ram or Pietro may expropriate her technology
and set up manufacture on their own. Also, the town is small so that there is room for only one
watchmaker, and since there are scale economies in advertising, the watchmaker who can produce
the most will prevail in any competition. Two factors will determine how much a watchmaker can
produce - how much of the technology she knows, and how many managers she has working for
her.
The watchmaker will certainly perform the tasks that are at the core of her new technology
herself so that the others do not directly learn how they are done. But she has to interact with
the managers. She has two ways of oering access to herself and the technology. She can have
Ram and Pietro interact only with her (see Figure I). We call this the horizontal hierarchy because
Ram and Pietro are equidistant from the watchmaker and her technology, and the watchmaker
2mediates all transactions within the organization. An alternative way is for the watchmaker to
interact only with Pietro (or Ram), and ask Ram to report to Pietro (see Figure II). This is the
vertical hierarchy where there is a chain of employees with the watchmaker at the top, and only
Pietro sees the watchmaker and her technology.
Once hired, managers can either attempt to expropriate the technology and compete (a combi-
nation of actions we will term \compete"), or they can learn to perform the tasks their immediate
superior has assigned them (i.e., specialize). Because superiors assign subordinates to tasks that
complement their own skills, managers, once specialized, are useless without their superior and
can be productive only in a team that contains the superior. Managers who neither specialize nor
compete are useless in production.
When managers interact directly with the watchmaker, they can observe her technology at close
quarters, though not perfectly. While the watchmaker can get a marginal product of 1 from each
manager in her team (and from herself), a manager operating with the expropriated technology
can produce only 0.75. Therefore, 75 percent is (for now) the degree of expropriability of the
technology and is a measure of the diculty of enforcing property rights. Managers who do not
interact directly with the watchmaker cannot expropriate the technology and will specialize if they
get enough from doing so.
Finally, we need to specify how output is divided among members of a team. Let us assume
that output in a production team is shared through bargaining from bottom up, with each manager
getting half of what he produces and half of what his subordinates send up - unless he happens to
be senior most in which case he gets everything that is sent up (we will describe the bargaining
game more formally later).
Now let us consider managerial incentives in each organizational form. In the horizontal hierar-
chy, each manager produces 1 after specializing, and keeps 1
2 of it. A manager could also compete.
3However, since the managers interact indirectly with each other via the watchmaker, they cannot
produce with each other as a team if the watchmaker does not join. So a manager who decides to
compete will have to produce with the stolen technology on his own. He can produce 0.75, but to
be able to generate this output he will rst have to survive the competition. Since the watchmaker
can produce 1 on her own, she will prevail in any competition. As a result, the manager will
anticipate getting nothing if he competes, and instead, will prefer specializing.
By forcing all interactions to go through the watchmaker, the horizontal hierarchy divides the
managers, in such a way that they will be easily defeated by the watchmaker even if they do
expropriate the technology. This allows the watchmaker to rule eectively. Landes [1986] argues
that organizations were, in fact, structured thus: \..patents were not always the best way to protect
knowledge. Instead, inventors preferred to try and keep devices and techniques secret, sometimes
by so dividing the process that no one worker could penetrate the technique. This is what the
great watchmaker Abraham-Louis Breguet proposed to do when he planned the mass production
of watches... the aim was ..security".
Matters are dierent in the vertical hierarchy. Ram cannot expropriate since Pietro is between
him and the watchmaker. Ram will specialize to Pietro if specialization is relatively costless. But
Pietro is in a very dierent position. If he specializes, he will keep half of the $1 he produces plus
half of the 1
2 Ram gives up for a total of 3
4. Pietro gets more than Ram, we will see, because the
vertical hierarchy gives him positional power { Ram is productive for the watchmaker only if Pietro
also joins them. This gives Pietro some bargaining power. Despite his positional power, however,
Pietro will compete because Ram will follow him out (since Ram is useless in any production team
without Pietro). Together with Ram, Pietro can produce a total of 1:5 if he competes. Since this is
greater than what the watchmaker can produce on her own, Pietro's team will win the competition.
Moreover, Pietro only has to give Ram half of what Ram produces (=0.5*0.75) as compensation,
4leaving 1:125 for himself.
We immediately see that the incentive for managers to compete is higher in the vertical hierarchy
because superior managers { and not the watchmaker { command the loyalty of subordinates. The
strength of their bench allows them to oset the technological advantage of the watchmaker, and
win the competition. Note, however, that if the degree of expropriability of the technology were
lower - less than 50 percent { Pietro would prefer to specialize.
Thus far, the horizontal hierarchy seems to dominate because the tactic of divide and conquer
is so eective. But the horizontal hierarchy \works" because managers have no positional power
whatsoever. While this is of little consequence when specialization costs managers little, it is
more problematic when costs are high. To see why, let the one-time personal cost to managers
of specialization be 1:01, and let each manager be able to work for two periods before retiring.
Finally, let the resource have a lower degree of expropriability, say 0.49.
Now managers in the horizontal hierarchy will not specialize (though they will not expropriate
either). This is because each period, their position gives them a payo of only 1
2, for a total of 1
over two periods, which is less than the cost of specialization. While, the relative lack of managerial
power in a horizontal hierarchy works well to prevent expropriation, it provides poor incentives for
the manager to specialize.
Even a vertical hierarchy does not seem possible since higher costs of specialization make
competing still more attractive than specialization. In particular, assuming Ram specializes, Pietro
does not want to specialize even though expropriability is at a level that ensured specialization when
the costs of specialization were zero. By specializing, Pietro gets 2 3
4 1:01 = 0:49 over two periods,
while he gets 2  0:49  1:5 = 1:47 by competing.2
There is a way, however, for the entrepreneur to use both Ram and Pietro in the vertical
organization, though not in the rst period. In the example thus far, Pietro will compete because
5he is already in a position of power, with Ram below him, when he is required to specialize. Instead,
the watchmaker should employ only Pietro in the rst period. Pietro alone cannot overcome the
watchmaker in competition. So he can either do nothing, or specialize and get 1
2 immediately.
In addition, Pietro knows that once he specializes, he will lose the incentive to compete in the
second period (we know from earlier that if expropriability is less than 50 percent, and if Pietro
does not have to incur the cost of specialization, he is loyal even with Ram as a subordinate). The
watchmaker will then be willing to trust him in the second period and will bring Ram in below
him as in Figure II. This structure will give Pietro positional power and enable him to get 3
4.
Anticipating a total payo of 1
2 + 3
4 over two periods, Pietro will specialize at the outset. Moreover,
since Pietro can work only two periods, Ram will anticipate his turn at power in period 3, and also
specialize and so on...3
Therefore, by restricting access initially to the technology to Pietro alone, the watchmaker
can obtain Pietro's specialization. Pietro can then be entrusted with more positional power even
though he would have chosen to compete if placed in that position when unspecialized. A specialized
manager is more loyal, and a watchmaker with specialized managers can produce more than one
starting anew. Specialized employees become a critical resource in their own right that grow slowly
in number over time, even though nothing in the technology prevents innite employees from being
hired and specializing at one go. The hierarchy evolves through specialization into something more
than a collection of people and resources.
Finally, there is a way to give managers in the horizontal hierarchy the incentive to specialize
when specialization is costly, despite their impotence. It is to promise them potential participation
in the rents from ownership of the critical resource if they specialize. The watchmaker will ensure
an adequate rent to managers by limiting the number who have access and thus can bid for
ownership. Moreover, when the critical resource is highly expropriable, the watchmaker's promise
6to sell is credible because it is very dicult for her to run the hierarchy as an inactive owner once
her two periods of active life are over. Thus the model not only suggests why organizations like
legal and consulting partnerships { where assets like client relationships are hard to protect - are

at, but also indicates what limits their size.
In sum, our model suggests that in the formative stages of a business, an entrepreneur uses
control over access to the resource and specialized employees, as well as the allocation of ownership
over the resource to design the right balance of power between herself and her managers. Too much
power to managers will destabilize her own position, too little will give them little interest in the
well being of the rm. In the vertical hierarchy, the entrepreneur controls access to the critical
resource so as draw forth specialization, and then uses specialized employees strategically to control
the actions of new employees. In the horizontal hierarchy, the entrepreneur limits access not just
to limit the current power of employees, but also to give them condence that if they specialize,
they will be among a select few that will have a chance to own the organization. The relative
abilities of these two distinctive structures to approach the technological production possibility
frontier depends on the parameters of the model, and results in a variety of empirical implications.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In section I we lay out the framework. In section II we
analyze vertical hierarchies in a simplied three-period model. The steady-state solution is derived
in section III, while in section IV, we analyze the path to the steady state. In section V, we
study horizontal hierarchies and compare them with vertical ones. In section VI, we discuss the
implications of our model for a theory of the rm. Conclusions follow.
I. Framework
We consider an overlapping generations world where each agent has two periods of physically
active life, a period when they are \young" and one when they are \old". After these two periods,
they retire and can, at best, exert control rights (which we shall dene momentarily) for the rest
7of his (or her) life. After retirement, an agent has a constant probability 
 of surviving the next
period. Everyone is risk neutral.
An agent called the entrepreneur, possesses a valuable resource that she wants to exploit. She
needs \managers" to produce on a large scale. Many managers are born every period.
A. Technology
Since our focus is not on the technological limits to organizational size, we assume the production
function is linear with each active agent contributing a unit of output. The total production of a
team composed of an active entrepreneur and n managers equals n + 1.4
B. Sequence of events each period
The sequence of events is described in Figure III. At the beginning of the period, the agent who
controls the resource determines the hierarchy of access to it.5 Then, the managers who are
granted access choose whether to specialize or compete. If any manager decides to compete, the
original hierarchy breaks up into competing teams. Only the team that can produce the most
survives. Finally, all the members of the successful team bargain over future surplus and sign
sharing contracts. At the end of the period, production takes place and the payo to each contract
is distributed.
C. Access
Following Rajan and Zingales [1998], we dene access as the ability to use, or work with, the critical
resource. Only a team of managers that has direct or indirect access to the resource can produce.
Future access is not contractible.6
We will assume that one active agent (and at most one agent), has to have direct access
to the resource. Call this agent the head. Other managers can have indirect access by having
8access to the head, or access to a manager who has access to the head and so on... The more
layers of management between a manager and the resource, the less access he has. We start by
examining vertical hierarchies of access where each manager has access to at most one member of
the production team who is closer to the resource (his superior) and one manager who is further
(his subordinate). If we dene the head to be tier 1 then a manager's tier, t, is uniquely dened
as one plus the tier of his superior. Figure IV depicts a vertical hierarchy with the entrepreneur as
the head and four additional managers.
D. Specialization
Managers can add value to a team only after they specialize, that is, after they familiarize themselves
with the resource (which is why they need some access) and learn to work with their superior in
the production team. A manager's cost of specializing is cS. Since the cost of specialization (or
training) for new recruits exceeds their value to the rm (see, for example, the evidence in Harho
and Kane [1993] and the literature cited in Prendergast [1999]), and managers produce at most 1,
we assume:
Assumption 1: cS > 1
A manager who specialized to a superior in the past does not need to specialize again if he
has the same superior this period, since he already knows the superior and is familiar with the
resource. The head does not have a superior, and does not have to specialize if he did so in the
past.7
E. Competition
Access also provides a manager with the opportunity to appropriate the critical resource. A
manager could grab the resource and compete with the entrepreneur instead of specializing. His
subordinates have no choice but to follow him since they are specialized to him.8
9Suppose a manager in tier k decides to compete. Together with his n k subordinates, he can
produce k(n k+1) where k is the degree of expropriability in tier k. The further the manager
is from the resource, the less he can expropriate, so k < j < 1 for all k > j > 0, and  for the
entrepreneur is 1. In order that competition be a serious threat, we will assume that:
Assumption 2: k > 1
2 for all k > 0.
The personal cost to the manager of competing is cR.9If a manager k decides to compete, all costs
in subsequent periods for his production team are also multiplied by k, indicating the stolen
resource is proportionally as hard to specialize to, or to appropriate. This preserves the symmetry
of the problem.
After the initial sub period when managers choose simultaneously to specialize, do nothing,
or compete, there is no time to train additional managers before production takes place. So in
Figure IV, if manager M3 decides to compete while the rest specialize, there are two feasible
production teams: the rst is headed by the entrepreneur, E, with subordinate manager M2 and
it can produce 2, and the second is headed by manager M3 with subordinates M4 and M5 and it
can produce 33.
To simplify the dynamics, we assume extreme economies of scale in marketing, which result
in a winner-take-all market where only the most productive team is successful and survives the
competition. So, in the example above, the team headed by the entrepreneur will survive if 2  33,
else the team headed by M3 will survive. We break ties in favor of the incumbent head.
We want to study how organizations emerge even in the most primitive economy, where con-
tracts are not easily enforced and sophisticated commitment mechanisms are not available. For
this reason we follow the incomplete contract literature (e.g., Grossman and Hart [1986]) in as-
suming that the end-of-period payo from production is not contractible until immediately before
production begins. As a result, just before a successful team is ready to produce, the members will
10have to bargain about their respective shares of output.
F. Bargaining
We assume the bargaining game to have the following extensive form. The manager at the bottom
of the hierarchy bargains with a unied coalition of his direct and indirect superiors over the total
surplus. The share the coalition gets from this rst stage of bargaining is then further subdivided
through bargaining, between the manager at the bottom of this coalition and a unied coalition of
his superiors. This carries on until the highest member of the hierarchy bargains with the second
highest and divides the residual.
In the bargaining between the coalition of superiors and the manager, the outside option of
the coalition is to produce without the manager (and his subordinates). The outside option of
the manager is to obtain a wage of 1    elsewhere.10 If a manager does not join the production
team, none of his subordinates are of use to the team. This is because it is he who mediates their
interaction with the rest of the hierarchy.
G. Outcome of Bargaining
Consider rst a hierarchy with n managers where the entrepreneur has retired. Total production
is also n since the entrepreneur contributes no labor. Now let us see how this surplus is split.
The lowest manager, Mn, with reservation value (1 ), bargains with the coalition formed by
higher tiers, who have a collective reservation value equal to n 1 (the value they produce on their




[n   (n   1)] +
1
2





2 is the portion of the lowest manager's production the coalition of superiors gets because of
11their control over the critical resource, and their total surplus is (n   1) + 
2. The lowest manager
of this coalition, Mn 1, then bargains with his superiors and he gets n 1 = 1
2[(n   1 + 
2)   (n  
2)] + 1
2[1   ] = 1   
4.
Manager Mn 1 gets more than manager Mn because only when Mn 1 joins the production
team will the hierarchy above him be able to use his subordinate, manager Mn. Thus manager
Mn 1 can extract half the surplus (i.e., half of =2) that manager Mn sends up because he controls
his subordinate's access.12
Manager Mk's payo in a hierarchy with n working managers is (see appendix):
k = 1  

2n k+1: (2)
A manager who controls access to more subordinates, n k, has more positional power, and thus
more rents. Note that the manager's payo does not depend at all on the number of his superiors.
This simplies the analysis considerably. 13 Also, the average pay of employees increases in the
size of the hierarchy, n, implying our model is consistent with the nding (e.g., Brown, Hamilton,
Medo [1990]) that larger rms pay higher wages on average.
The retired entrepreneur's payo is the residual amount, which is easily shown to be
E(n) = n  
n X
j=1
j = (1  
1
2n): (3)
Thus, and quite naturally, the retired entrepreneur's rents increase as managers' reservation wage
(1   ) decreases. The entrepreneur's payo if she is active and heads n   1 managers can be
obtained by simply adding her rents from control of the resource to the payo she would get
as the top active manager, the rents to her human capital. Thus her payo if she is active is
(1   1
2n) + (1   
2n). Since E(n)   E(n   1) > 0, the entrepreneur's payo increases in n. This
12implies that in the absence of any other consideration, the entrepreneur would set the length of
the hierarchy to its rst best value, i.e., innity.
The two important features of this bargaining structure are: i) for a given size of the hierarchy a
manager's rent increases as his position moves up the hierarchy; ii) for a given position, a manager's
rent increases in the number of subordinates. These features are more general than the particular
bargaining structure in which they are derived. They come from the hierarchy of access, which gives
managers positional power: Since only continuous chains of specialized managers are productive,
intermediate managers get some rent because they are indispensable links to lower managers.
H. The Entrepreneur's Problem
The entrepreneur's objective is to maximize the present value of the rents she will get. Long
term compensation contracts cannot be credibly committed to, so managerial compensation will
be determined by bargaining, which in turn depends on the skills acquired by the manager and
their role in the hierarchy of access.14 The entrepreneur therefore can shape managerial incentives
only through organizational structure. We have already examined one tool she can use, control
over access, which she uses every period. Another tool entrepreneurs have when they start out is
the extent to which their organization is dierentiated.
The entrepreneur often can determine the extent to which the manager is mobile. For example,
among equally productive technologies, the entrepreneur can choose one that is more unique,
making it harder for an un-cooperative manager to nd a job elsewhere. She can locate far away
from comparable employment so that the manager has to relocate completely if he quits (e.g.,
Rodriguez, [1999]). She can make the organization's culture distinctive so that managers get
disutility working elsewhere. This ability of the entrepreneur to \dierentiate" the technology,
location, or culture will be re
ected in the specialized manager's reservation wage conditional on
specializing. Specialization will take the manager's reservation wage from zero to (1   ), where 
13is the extent of dierentiation chosen by the entrepreneur and 1   >   0. Since dierentiation
is based on factors like technology that are typically hard to alter, we assume the entrepreneur
picks it once and for all at the outset.
Having determined the degree of dierentiation at the outset, the entrepreneur will choose
access each period { which includes setting both the number of managers who have access and
also who reports to whom { so that the maximum number of managers will all specialize; more
specialized managers this period implies more production, and since managers can always be let go
next period, it poses no constraints on future production. Since the cost of specialization exceeds
the maximum possible single period rent any position in the hierarchy can oer, unspecialized
managers will be given access only when they are young. Furthermore, an old manager will be
given access only if he specialized in the past, and he can be placed as the head this period or
below his former superior (else his past specialization is wasted and he has no incentive to specialize
again). Also, the entrepreneur will not want to allow access to any manager who is expected to
break away and compete since that manager (and his subordinates) are useless to the entrepreneur's
production team, even assuming they are not successful in the competition.
Most issues of organizational design can be examined in a simple three period model. This is
where we start.
II. The Three Period Model
Let the world last for three periods and assume that the hierarchy reaches its large but nite
steady-state length N in the third period. The steady state length, which we will derive formally
later, turns out to be the maximum size the hierarchy can reach. For now, it gives us a simple
terminal condition. Let nt be the number of managers who get access for the rst time in period
t and specialize.
14A. Managerial Incentives
A manager will not choose to compete if he expects his team to lose the winner-take-all competition
against the entrepreneur and her followers. Call this the competition constraint (CC). Even condi-
tional on expecting to win, he will not compete if he expects less surplus from doing so than from
specializing. Call this the conditional incentive compatibility (IC) constraint. Only one of these
constraints has to hold for the manager not to compete. Also, in his initial period the manager
should prefer to specialize and get a rent rather than do nothing and get nothing (IR constraint).
The entrepreneur will use dierences in these constraints across managers and over time to build
the hierarchy.
B. Incentives at date 2
Let us proceed by backward induction, and examine the incentives at date 2 rst. The n1 managers
who specialized at date 1 are now old but still active. They are useful only if they are placed
immediately below the still active entrepreneur in the same order that they were in last period { if
any of these managers ends up with a dierent superior than in the past, he will have to specialize
again. Since the one-period payo does not compensate for the cost, he will not specialize and will
render everyone below him useless to the hierarchy this period.
Of course, some or all the old managers could be red at date 2 starting from the managers
at the bottom. Let n0
1  n1 old managers be retained at date 2, and placed in their date-1 order
immediately below the active entrepreneur. The n2 young unspecialized managers who have a cost
cS of specialization will be placed after this.
We want to nd conditions under which all managers specialize. If all specialize, the length
of the productive team will be 1 + n0
1 + n2 because the entrepreneur is still active. Assuming all
others specialize, a manager in tier k knows if he competes, he and his 1+n0
1+n2 k subordinates
15will be defeated by the k   1 member team consisting of his superiors and the entrepreneur if
(CCS2) k (2 + n0
1 + n2   k) < k   1:
The fear of being defeated is least for the highest manager in the hierarchy (k=2); he has the
most access, carries the most subordinates out with him if he competes, and only has to defeat the
solitary entrepreneur. In fact, our assumptions ensure that the highest old manager will defeat the
entrepreneur if he competes.15
The only reason then that he will specialize is if he gets more doing so then competing. For an




1+n2 k]  k[(1  
1
22+n0






2N )]   cR:
The left-hand side is the manager's rent from working for the hierarchy for the last period of
his active life. The right hand side is the expected payo from competing, where the rst term is
the break away manager's rent this period from control of the appropriated resource, the second
is his rent from his own human capital, the third is his rent in the third period when he will be
retired, but will still control the resource.
From assumption 2, it is easily seen that the right hand side of (ICS2) will increase faster with
the number of the manager's subordinates, 1 + n0
1 + n2   k than the left hand side.16 Therefore,
the old specialized manager with the greatest incentive to breakaway and compete is again the one
with the greatest number of subordinates, i.e., the one just below the active entrepreneur in tier
k = 2. It turns out, however, that so long as the hierarchy's size is less than the steady state size,
N, this constraint will not bind. The reason is that in steady state at date 3, the old head will
have more subordinates and be closer to the resource (because the entrepreneur will have retired)
16than any old manager at date 2. Since in steady state the head will not compete, it must be that
no old manager wants to compete at date 2.
This implies that at date 2 the only limit to the size of the hierarchy is imposed by the incentives
of the young, unspecialized managers. For them to specialize rather than compete, either they
should not expect to survive the winner-take-all competition or they should expect to get less from
competing even if they survive. Consider the latter condition rst. From arguments similar to
ones above, the young manager with the greatest incentive to compete is the one who is placed
highest in his incoming cohort of n2 managers, i.e., in tier 2 + n0
1. Since the entrepreneur, and all
managers who entered at date 1, retire at date 3, this manager will become the head at date 3 if
















Comparing (ICU2) with (ICS2), it is easy to see that (ICU2) may be violated even when (ICS2)
is not. The left hand side of (ICU2), which is the young unspecialized manager's payo if he
specializes, includes two extra terms relative to an old manager's payo (the left hand side of
(ICS2)). First, since the old are in their nal working period in the organization, they do not get
rents next period (because they will retire). By contrast, a young manager has one more period
in the hierarchy after the current one in which he can earn a rent. While this eect alone would
give the young manager more incentive to specialize, the young manager also incurs the cost of
specialization. Since this cost exceeds any single period rent, the net benet from specialization is
relatively lower for the unspecialized young than for the specialized old in the same position.
Also the right-hand sides dier. The benet from competing is relatively higher for the un-
specialized young because the young manager will be active in the third period, and expects the
high rents from his own human capital (in addition to the rents from the control over the resource
17which are also enjoyed by an old manager who competes). Taking both sides together, in any given
position in the hierarchy, young unspecialized managers have a higher incentive to compete than
old specialized managers. Therefore, (ICU2) may be violated even if (ICS2) is satised.
If so, the only reason young managers will not compete is if they do not expect to win the
competition. Again, the highest young manager has the greatest likelihood of success because he
is closest to the critical resource, and has the greatest number of subordinates below him. He will
lose the winner-take-all competition if
(CCU2) 2+n0
1 n2 < 1 + n0
1:
The left hand side is the amount the young unspecialized manager can produce with the rest
of his cohort who follow him, the right hand side is the amount the entrepreneur can produce with
the loyal old managers. Either (ICU2) or (CCU2) has to be satised for the young manager not
to compete. So only one of the constraints will (generically) be binding, a fact that will greatly
simplify the ex ante maximization problem.
It is now easy to see why specialized old managers are placed above unspecialized young man-
agers in the hierarchy. Old managers benet less than the young by competing, hence they are
better suited to occupy the higher positions in the hierarchy where the incentive to compete is high-
est. Interestingly, such a policy of access also improves the incentive of the unspecialized young.
For a given length of hierarchy, this policy ensures the highest young manager has the fewest possi-
ble subordinates, and is furthest away from the resource. Not only does such a policy give him the
lowest return from competing even if successful, it also decreases his chance of being successful since
the entrepreneur will be supported by the loyal Praetorian Guard of the specialized. As a result,
the policy allows the entrepreneur to hire the most young. It follows that the number of specialized
managers retained at the top of the hierarchy at date 2 is the entire number who specialized in
18the rst period, i.e., n0
1 = n1. In the appendix, we show more generally that a seniority-based
promotion policy where all specialized old managers are retained and placed in their prior-period
order above unspecialized young managers provides managers the best incentives. Thus, we have
Proposition 1. The level of production that can be achieved from any point in time onwards
by a vertical hierarchy weakly, and sometimes strictly, increases in the number of managers
who are active at that point and made specic investments in the past.
Now let us examine incentives at date 1.
C. Incentives in period 1
The hierarchy starts out in the rst period, so all managers are unspecialized and young. The
incentive constraints of the young manager immediately below the entrepreneur will be tightest,
and we can write them as
(ICU1) [1  

2n1 ] + [1  

2n1+n2 ]   cS  2[(1  
1














2N )]   cR:
(CCU1) 2 n1 < 1:
where nR
2 is the number of young managers who will be given access at date 2 by the manager who
successfully breaks away at date 1. Since only one of these constraints has to be satised, the one
that is satised with the most number of managers n1 will be the limiting one.
19D. IR constraint
Finally, we have ignored IR constraints thus far. A manager's rents increase as the number of
subordinates below him increases. Thus, the manager who is at the bottom of the hierarchy today
expects the lowest rents of his cohort if he specializes because the rest of his cohort will continue to
be placed above him in the future. Therefore, the relevant IR constraint is that of the lowest young
manager. Moreover, since the number of young hired increases over time, promotional prospects
improve, and the most binding IR constraint is of the lowest unspecialized young manager in the
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E. The Entrepreneur's Maximization Problem.
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subject to the managers having the incentives to specialize, i.e, s.t.
(1) CCU1 or ICU1
(2) CCU2 or ICU2
(3) IR
Now consider two important cases.
F. Case 1: Uniformly high threat of competition in hierarchy.
Let expropriability, , be high and constant with distance from the resource because all managers
need signicant access in order to function. This would be the case for example, in a rm where
20the critical resource is an idea or code that all managers need to know to be productive. The only
way to prevent managers from competing is to convince them they cannot be successful in the
winner-take-all competition. The relevant constraints in this case are (CCU1);(CCU2); and IR.
Let the Int operator be the greatest integer less than its argument. Then CCU1 implies n
1 =
Int[ 1
] = 1 because  > 1
2 by assumption 2. So the entrepreneur will hire only one young manager
at date 1, because more will overwhelm her in competition. In period 2, the entrepreneur is
condent of her own loyalty as well as this employee's loyalty, so CCU2 indicates she can hire
n
2 = Int[ 2
]  2.
At the outset, the entrepreneur would like to set the degree of dierentiation, , as high as
possible so as to extract the most rents from the managers. So the optimal degree of dierentiation,
, will be set so that managers are left with enough to just satisfy the IR constraint. Interestingly,
the necessity of motivating early employees may set in place a degree of dierentiation that will
persist long after the original rationale vanishes.
Ignoring integer constraints, the comparative statics are (all proofs are in the Appendix)
Proposition 2. (i) dn
2=d  0; (ii) d=d  0.
The rst result is obvious: the hierarchy is kept small when expropriability increases so that
the entrepreneur and loyal specialized managers can keep the young unspecialized in check. More
interestingly, the reduced size of the date-2 hierarchy will decrease promotional prospects. The
entrepreneur will then be forced to give employees a greater share of every unit produced so
that they continue to have the incentive to specialize. Thus, when expropriability increases, the
entrepreneur is forced to lower the degree of dierentiation, and her rents decrease even further.
Proposition 2 throws some light on Saxenian's [1996] comparison between computer industry
rms along Route 128 in Massachusetts and in Silicon Valley, California. Route 128 rms tended
to be large, vertically integrated organizations with very distinctive cultures. There was very little
21lateral movement between these organizations. In Silicon Valley, by contrast, rms were smaller,
and possessed a more homogenous culture, with a lot of fraternizing and job hopping.
Saxenian provides a sociological interpretation of these ndings, contrasting the buttoned-down,
risk-averse East Coast culture with the more casual and risk- loving West. While we do not deny
these aspects may have played a role, we can provide an explanation based more on economics.
Since in the computer industry the main critical resource is ideas, the degree of expropriability
is potentially very high. Computer rms are very much aware of this problem and require their
employees to sign non-compete clauses. But California, unlike Massachusetts, has a historical
tradition of not enforcing these clauses. This institutional dierence represents a rare case of an
exogenous dierence in expropriability in the same industry. Consistent with the predictions of
Proposition 2, in Massachusetts where expropriability is lower, organizations are bigger and show
more dierentiated technologies and culture { as evidenced by the lower job mobility across rms.
Thus, better enforcement of property rights (lower ) can tilt rents towards the entrepreneur
{ since she does not have to provide as much in incentives to ward o potential breakaway, she
can dierentiate more to extract surplus from worker-managers. This might appear to vindicate
Marx's position that the enforcement of private ownership claims to capital enables capitalists to
\exploit" workers (see Roemer [1988] for a lucid exposition). However, this comparative statics
result can be reversed in other circumstances as we will now see.
G. Case 2: High threat of competition in close positions
Consider now a rm where only the managers in direct contact with the resource have sucient
access to appropriate while expropriability falls o dramatically with distance. This is the case,
for example, in a rm where client relationships are the key resource. Only the partner dealing
with clients has an ability to walk o with them, while the lowly associate who does all the ground
work has no contact with clients and little ability to expropriate. In particular, if 2 is very high,
22the CC constraint will bind in period 1. This implies that n1 = 1; only one manager will be
given access. But because this manager will specialize, he can loyally ll the position in period 2
without competing. Since expropriability is lower for the remaining subordinate positions, the IC
constraint rather than the CC constraint is likely to bind. Substituting n1 = 1 in (ICU2), ignoring
the IR constraint for the moment, and solving the maximization problem (see appendix), we get a
bang-bang solution. The optimal degree of dierentiation,  is 1 if

[43   2][1  
1
2N ] + [43   3] + (23   1)
1
2N  0; (4)
and  =  otherwise. Given , n
2 is the maximum value consistent with (ICU2).
The entrepreneur's prots increase both in the number of managers n2 and the extent of dier-
entiation, . However, as size increases, the highest young manager will have more subordinates,
and therefore more incentive to compete. Similarly, an increase in dierentiation not only gives the
young manager less incentive to specialize, but also increases his surplus conditional on winning
the competition { more dierentiation is a double-edged sword since it concentrates rents on the
possessor of the critical resource, thus making expropriation more attractive. Since (ICU2) becomes
tighter as either  or n2 increase,  and n
2 are strategic substitutes.
Condition (4) simply indicates when the entrepreneur gets more bang for the buck by increasing
. Since the left hand side of (4) increases in 3,  increases in 3, so n
2 must decrease to keep
inequality (ICU2) satised. Therefore,
Proposition 3. (i) d=d3  0; (ii) dn
2=d3  0.
Now with better property rights (lower 3), the prot maximizing entrepreneur will increase
the size of the organization, thus increasing the societal pie. But, in order to preserve manage-
rial incentives not to compete in a longer hierarchy, she will have to reduce the rents (lower )
23she extracts o each manager. Thus, stricter enforcement of the entrepreneur's private property
rights can lead to more surplus for worker-managers, and in contrast to the previous case, less
\exploitation".
We ignored the IR constraint in determining the above solution. If IR is satised at the optimal,
then it will have no eect. If not, the trade-o will move in favor of n
2 at the expense of , since
a longer date-2 hierarchy will improve anticipated promotional prospects at date 1, while a lower
 will tilt rents towards the manager.
H. Discussion
In the literature there are two main roles for promotion (see Prendergast [1999] for an excellent
survey): as a way for the rm to allocate more talented workers to higher positions with greater
marginal in
uence (e.g., Rosen [1982]), or as a reward for performance (e.g., Lazear and Rosen
[1981], Rosen [1986]). Talented workers are not necessarily the most senior ones, but seniority may
be a useful and objective index of talent that reduces in
uence activities (Milgrom and Roberts
[1990]). In our model, however, we abstract from issues of productivity { all managers are equally
productive. Promotion is then simply a way of lling sensitive positions with the loyal.
Interestingly, concern about expropriation enables the hierarchy to commit to rewarding spe-
cialization, and we do not have to rely on repeated games to explain why the rm does not renege
on promised promotions(see Bull [1987]). In this, our work resembles that of Lazear [1981] or
Akerlof and Katz [1989] who argue that deferred compensation paid to older workers also serves as
an incentive for younger workers. Our work, however, diers in that compensation emerges from
the endogenous organizational structure rather than as part of an optimal pay package. Thus, it
does not require any exogenous source of commitment by the rm.
The upward-sloped prole of wages is also consistent with Becker [1975], who points out that
a reduced initial salary is a way for young workers to post a bond for the training provided by the
24rm. In our model, however, it is the worker who bears the cost of the initial training, and his low
wage is simply a re
ection of his low bargaining power, while his upward wage prole indicates his
growing power in the rm.
In the interests of space, we skip other cases in the three period model that add little additional
insight. We now examine the steady state.
III. The Limits to Growth
The articial end-date prevented us from determining a steady state in the previous section.
We remedy this now by reverting to the innite period world.
We dene a steady state equilibrium as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game where the
state (the number of old specialized managers) is repeated every period.18 We solve for the steady
state equilibrium in Markov strategies assuming that there are no constraints on the initial state, so
that the entrepreneur can start out with any number of specialized old managers. If the hierarchy
can progress beyond initial growth traps (see later), this will indeed be the ultimate size of the
hierarchy.
In a steady state equilibrium, each cohort will have equal size. There will be an equal number
of specialized managers above the highest entering young manager, and he can never win in com-
petition against them because  < 1. Therefore, the only limit to the size of the organization is
that the IC constraint should hold for the specialized head manager. Let n() = [logf[1(2  

)=(1   
)   1]=[1(1 +    
)=(1   
)   1   cR]g]=2log2. Then,
Proposition 4. The vertical hierarchy has a cohort size in steady state Markov Perfect equilibrium
of (i) nV = 1 if cR  1(2+ 
))=(1 
) 1 (ii) nV = n if cR < 1(2+ 
)=(1 
) 1.
If the condition in (i) holds, then the IC constraint for the highest old manager always holds
regardless of the hierarchy's length. Hence the hierarchy's steady state length is innity. Otherwise,
25the head manager cannot have more than a certain number below him, else he will compete. This
is the situation in (ii).
This result has been obtained conditional on a given choice of the level of dierentiation. An
entrepreneur who wants to maximize the long run steady state level of prot will choose  to
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and nV = 1.
Intuitively, it is more protable for the entrepreneur to increase the steady state size of the
hierarchy by reducing  than to squeeze more out of each manager by increasing . Therefore, so
long as the size of the hierarchy is less than innity, the entrepreneur will reduce  to its minimum
possible level. Of course, if the potential size of the hierarchy reaches innity at some level of 
above , the entrepreneur has no need to reduce  further. In short, the entrepreneur dierentiates
the vertical hierarchy minimally.
When  =  (and the steady state length of the hierarchy is nite) we can easily derive the
comparative statics for steady state size:
Corollary 1. An increase in the cost of competition, cR, a decrease in expropriability, 1, or a
decrease in the probability of survival, 
, increase the steady state length of the hierarchy.
Thus, better protection of property rights, both in the sense of increasing the cost of competing,
and reducing expropriability, increases the steady state length of the hierarchy. Moreover, the more
likely agents are to survive after retirement, the more they value long-run rents from property
26compared to short-run income from employment, and the greater the incentive to break away and
compete.
A. Discussion
A persistent result is the adverse eect of an increase in expropriability on the size of the hierarchy
whether at an interim date or in steady state. This suggests that when property rights are weak,
vertical hierarchies are small because the threat of expropriation does not allow them to grow and
production is stunted. As property rights become better enforced, vertical hierarchies are larger
and production is higher. When property rights are perfectly enforced ( = 0), however, there is
nothing distinctive about the hierarchy in our framework and its size becomes indeterminate.
This provides a testable implication of our model. Countries with poor enforcement of property
rights should have small organizations and low per-capita income. Countries with better enforce-
ment of property rights should have larger organizations and higher per-capita income. Finally,
countries with an excellent enforcement of property rights have organizations of indeterminate size
but also enjoy very high per capita income.
One might also think that the extent of expropriability would vary across industries within
a country. Property rights to physical assets are enforced in all but the most rapacious regimes.
However, a more sophisticated legal system is needed to enforce property rights to intangible assets
such as ideas or client relationships. This suggests a more subtle testable implication: the relative
size of rms in industries with intangible assets should increase when the eciency of the judicial
system improves.
In their study of rm size across industries and 15 European countries, Kumar, Rajan and Zin-
gales [1999] test these implications. They nd that asset intensive industries where expropriability
is likely to be lowest have larger rms. They also nd that countries with more ecient judicial
systems have larger rms. Furthermore, after correcting for industry and country eects, they nd
27that the relative size of rms in industries with intangible assets increases when the eciency of
the judicial system improves.
As we have argued, expropriability can also depend on the extent to which competition is
allowed. If regulations, or the state, assure a monopoly to the incumbent, then expropriability
is small, regardless of the enforcement of property rights. Therefore, state or natural monopolies
are likely to have long hierarchies. Not surprisingly, the rst long hierarchies in history were the
army and the administration, two state monopolies. Interestingly, when property rights tend to be
weakly enforced, these tend to be the only organizations of any size.
Finally, our model indicates the dangers for an entrepreneur in attempting to keep too much for
herself in the early stages by dierentiating the organization extensively. Not only do managers have
little incentive to specialize, but also a high degree of dierentiation concentrates a large amount
of rents in the hands of the one who controls the critical resource making expropriation more
attractive to subordinates. Analogously, the centralization of resources in a political dictatorship
can undermine the survival of the dictator because it provides incentives for a coup by others. In
order to achieve a stable organization, the entrepreneur has to sprinkle rents throughout it. This
is precisely what a low degree of dierentiation achieves.
IV. The Path to the Steady State
To conclude our analysis of vertical hierarchies, let us ask how the hierarchy will grow to this
steady state. As we have seen, specialized managers will not compete when the hierarchy is of
smaller length than the steady state size, i.e., on the path to the steady state. Therefore, the
entrepreneur only needs to ensure the young managers do not compete. We will focus on the case
when the resource is highly expropriable so that the entrepreneur has to ensure each period that
she has the backing of enough specialized managers to defeat the highest unspecialized manager.
Under these circumstances, we have already seen that the entrepreneur can give access to only
28one unspecialized manager in the rst period. Importantly, if the entrepreneur cannot be active in
the rst period, she will not be able to start the organization since she can only hire unspecialized
managers who will break away and dispossess her. Thus, it is the entrepreneur's ability to man the
most sensitive positions at the outset, before managerial loyalties are established, that enables her
to start an organization with strangers. Moreover, control over access alone will not be enough,
since the threat of competition is high, so the organization cannot be started by an arm's length
owner. Only when the hierarchy has specialized employees can outside ownership arise.
If the entrepreneur was young to begin with, she can be active for one more period in which
case the number hired in the second period satises 3  n2  2. This yields n2 = Int[ 2
3]  2.
Even though the entrepreneur retires now, the number of young managers that can be hired will





Using (6) and ignoring integer problems, the rate of growth of the hierarchy, which is [(nt +
nt 1)   (nt 1 + nt 2)]=[(nt 1 + nt 2)], simplies to
1=nt 1+1 nt 2+1
1+nt 2+1 .
It is easily checked that the growth rate increases over time. If expropriability decreases to a
constant  beyond a certain distance from the resource (as seems natural), the growth rate becomes
a constant 1
   1, independent of size. This is Gibrat's Law, derived not from industry market
structure and opportunities (see Sutton [1997] for an excellent review of the literature), but from
endogenous internal constraints on rm growth.
A. Growth Traps
Despite the apparent inevitability of growth depicted above, there are situations when a hierarchy
is doomed to remain small. If the hierarchy in its initial stages is expected to grow slowly (because
29of the high risk of expropriation), it may not provide managers enough future rents to give them
an incentive to specialize. As a result, the hierarchy may not even start up. Another way of saying
this is that improvements in the enforcement of property rights may draw forth more specialized
organizations in an economy.
A hierarchy will also stagnate if at any point it cannot hire more new employees than existing
old. For example, n2 = 2 if expropriability is high enough, so only two unspecialized managers in
the second period. But the entrepreneur must retire in the third period as must his rst specialized
manager. This leaves the hierarchy with only two specialized managers in the third period, the
same as it had in the second period. The hierarchy is trapped at a level of four managers (two
specialized and two unspecialized).
A similar growth trap is encountered if the entrepreneur is old by the time he acquires the
critical resource. Even though he can hire one manager initially, the entrepreneur has to retire
in the next period, leaving just one active specialized manager again. The hierarchy cannot grow
beyond two employees (one old, one young) because the entrepreneur does not remain active long
enough to build a suciently large cadre to grow the rm.
B. Evading growth traps
The important point to retain is that even though a hierarchy of substantial length may be feasible,
actual organizations may never reach that size. But this suggests that temporary shocks can move
a hierarchy out of, or into, a growth trap and can have long-term consequences.
For example, a hierarchy can escape a growth trap when an entrepreneur can employ people
such as family who will not compete because they have strong social costs of doing so. This
may explain why behind the success of many professionally-managed rms lie families who were
critical in its initial stages. Hobsbawm [1996, p241] suggests such this was important in the early
development of European rms in the period 1848-1875: \The economic advantages of a large
30family ...were of course still substantial. Within the business it guaranteed capital, perhaps useful
business contacts, and above all reliable managers".20
Another phenomenon our model may explain is why so many venerable rms today got their
start in times of war. During wars, governments typically confer monopolies on a chosen few (to
prevent \waste"). Since government-sanctioned monopoly implies low expropriability, rms can
grow substantially in such times without fear. But this temporary advantage may be enough to get
them over the growth trap so that even after the war ends and expropriability returns to normal,
these rms retain their size and growth rates.
Adverse temporary shocks can also have permanent eects by decimating a rm's stock of
organizational capital. Suppose a temporary shock (such as an economic depression or a nancial
crisis) depresses the prospects of future rents within an organization, and hence the young managers'
incentive to make specic investments. This will lead to a drastic reduction in the number of
specialized managers available next period. The number of specialized will have to be rebuilt
painstakingly slowing the recovery. The rm's feasible size as well as its rate of growth could fall
considerably. In extreme situations, rms could nd themselves back in a growth trap with no way
out, even if opportunities returned to their old values.
V. Horizontal Hierarchies
Thus far, we have focused on vertical hierarchies where the primary problem is the incentive
to breakaway and compete. One alternative arrangement stands out as a remedy { the horizon-
tal hierarchy where the head has multiple subordinates in the tier immediately below her (see
Figure V).
Since none of the managers have subordinates in this hierarchy, the active entrepreneur alone
can defeat any manager who competes (and managers cannot form coalitions against her because
they are not specialized to each other). So through a process of divide and conquer - preventing
31managers from having subordinates that they can take with them { the entrepreneur ensures
competition is not a concern.21
Of course, to continue with a horizontal hierarchy, on retirement the entrepreneur has to transfer
control to a manager. In the last period of the entrepreneur's active life, his subordinates have
all specialized. Since all these subordinates have knowledge of the resource, the entrepreneur can
transfer control to one of them.
Let us assume that control is transferred via an auction where the gains from trade are dis-
tributed among players according to their Shapley value. If the cohort size is n the Shapley value
of a generic specialized manager is 1
n(n+1)S,where S is the surplus accruing to the coalition of the
potential purchasers and seller.22 Since there are n managers who can purchase, the surplus that
accrues to the seller is n
n+1S. This is also the price P the chosen purchaser pays for control.
The rest of the managers who specialized will have to be red since they are now old, and do
not have the incentive to specialize to the new boss. They will be replaced by young hires, who
have better incentives to specialize because they have eyes on the prize of becoming the head next
period.
Therefore, the surplus to be split in the auction is the total production next period minus the
surplus that goes to next period's n managers (1   
2) each, plus the price P at which today's
purchaser will sell the resource at the end of the period; i.e.,
S = n + 1   (1  

2
)n + P: (7)
Substituting S = n+1
n P in (7) and solving for P, we get P = n[1 + n
2 ]. The equilibrium steady
state price is much more than the total surplus extracted by the head in a period (of (1 + n
2 )).
This is because the price embeds some of the surplus extracted o future cohorts of managers.


















The expected surplus falls in the number of managers because each manager faces more com-
petition in the auction for ownership. Interestingly, the surplus does not depend on the level of
dierentiation. What a manager loses to the entrepreneur in the rst period as a result of a higher
, he recovers (in expectation) as a head in the second period.













which is increasing in both  and n.
Since the constraint (9) does not depend on , the entrepreneur will choose  = 1 and set the
optimal value nH so that the IR constraint (9) is just met. Therefore, comparing with the result
in proposition 5, we have
Proposition 6. The degree of dierentiation in a horizontal hierarchy always weakly exceeds and
sometimes strictly exceeds the degree of dierentiation in a vertical hierarchy.
This highlights an important dierence between a vertical and horizontal organizations. Ver-
tical organizations nd it optimal not to dierentiate too much because this concentrates rents at
the top and limits their potential size. In the horizontal organization, however, the incentive to
33expropriate is controlled by the strategy of divide and rule and is unaected by how much rents are
concentrated at the top. Moreover, rents are naturally spread through the process of sale; what is
lost by a manager in a horizontal organization in wages is picked up in expected ownership so the
manager's individual rationality constraint is unaected by dierentiation. As a result, horizontal
organizations dierentiate maximally. It follows that the wages of the lowest manager, (1  
2), are
lower in a horizontal organization than in the vertical organization, and if the lowest managers are
on their IR constraint, the former organization's expected income prole is more steeply sloped.
A. Will Control Be Sold?
Thus far, we have assumed that the entrepreneur will sell control. Given the impossibility of
commitment, however, this sale will take place only if the entrepreneur has no better option other
than selling. Perhaps, however, she could continue to maintain control.
Apart from the vertical hierarchy, there are potentially other forms of organization that could
allow the entrepreneur to maintain control of the resource. For example, on retirement from the
horizontal hierarchy, the entrepreneur could place an experienced manager as head and continue
to retain control of the resource. As we argue in the appendix, this hybrid (and other hybrid
forms) do not provide managers adequate incentives to specialize when  = 1, and are therefore
not feasible.23
This leaves the entrepreneur only one alternative: to convert the horizontal hierarchy into a
vertical hierarchy. It is easy to show that anticipating such a conversion, no manager in the initial
horizontal hierarchy has the incentive to specialize. Therefore, for the prospect of selling to be
seen as credible ex ante, the entrepreneur should prefer selling control to one manager rather than
retaining control through organizational change. While the size of the vertical hierarchy (and hence
the prospective rents to the entrepreneur from conversion) decrease in the ease of expropriability
(high , low cR), the size and rents in the horizontal hierarchy are unaected by these parameters
34since expropriability is not a concern. Therefore, conversion is dominated, and the entrepreneur's
promise to sell control can be credible only when the ease of expropriability is very high. We have
Proposition 7. Consider a critical resource with parameters   f1;:::;ng =  , and cR =  cR.
If the entrepreneur prefers setting up a horizontal hierarchy at the outset, she also prefers to
do so whenever     and cR   cR.
This proposition implies that there is a threshold of expropriability above which the horizontal
hierarchy will always be preferred.
B. Comparison of Horizontal and Vertical Hierarchies
Consider now the dierence between a vertical and a horizontal hierarchy. The main incentive
problem in a vertical hierarchy is expropriability. This limits the size of the hierarchy. The nature
of the hierarchy, however, puts positional power in the hands of managers. So managers are secure
in their rents and have the incentive to specialize.
In a horizontal hierarchy, expropriability is dealt with by a process of divide and conquer. No
subordinate has enough power to overcome the head. But this gives them very little positional
power, and therefore little incentive to specialize. Hence the need of an internal sale of control
so as to motivate the incoming cohort to specialize. Moreover, size has to be limited so that
each manager has a reasonable chance of getting control. In other words, size is constrained by
individual rationality in horizontal hierarchies, while it is constrained by incentive compatibility in
vertical hierarchies.
From proposition 7, we should expect horizontal hierarchies to predominate in sectors where
expropriability is very high. This accords with casual empiricism. The critical resources in human
capital intensive industries are strategies, client lists, and ideas, that are very hard to protect,
thus the 
at structure of law and consulting rms. Interestingly, these are also the rms where
35older managers sell their ownership stakes to select proven younger managers (see Bhide [1996], for
example). By contrast, organizations with very steep organizational pyramids typically seem to
be found in physical capital intensive industries like automobiles or natural or ocially-sanctioned
monopolies like utilities and the government. If the property rights to physical capital are easily
protected from expropriation, and monopolies protected by denition from competition, these are
indeed organizations with a low  and our model predicts the observed vertical hierarchies.
Horizontal hierarchies will have stronger cultures or more distinctive technologies of production
than vertical hierarchies. This is because the expected rents from ownership are widely spread in a
horizontal hierarchy so the entrepreneur can get the initial rents from dierentiating the hierarchy
without destroying the incentives of managers. As a result, owners \exploit" new employees more
in a horizontal hierarchy, but this is compensated in the long run because employees have a chance
of becoming owners and \exploiting" succeeding generations of employees.
Vertical and horizontal organizations dier in their treatment of the specialized old. In the
vertical hierarchy, they are a valuable resource who can man critical positions, allowing the en-
trepreneur to expand the hierarchy. In the horizontal hierarchy, apart from the favored few who
get ownership, they are detritus to be discarded. Unlike the unspecialized young, the old have no
prospect of ownership, and will not make the additional investment needed to make themselves use-
ful. Thus up-or-out policies follow naturally from dierences in the nature of the hierarchies.24 An
immediate corollary is that vertical hierarchies will take time to reach their potential size because
they have to build on past specialization, while horizontal hierarchies can reach their potential
quickly.
Finally, the sale of the resource to employees substantially alters incentives in a horizontal
hierarchy while it does little in a vertical hierarchy. The reasons are instructive. First, in a
horizontal hierarchy the head extracts a signicant portion of the human capital that subordinates
36contribute. So the critical resource in a horizontal organization is eectively a claim on a large
portion of the human capital of future generations of subordinates. Clearly, the prospect of getting
some of it can improve investment incentives substantially. By contrast, in a vertical hierarchy,
current managers absorb much of the surplus they generate each period, so very little of the human
capital of future generations is embodied in the critical resource. Second, in a horizontal hierarchy,
once the head is loyal, subordinates have little incentive to compete. By contrast, in a vertical
organization, ensuring the loyalty of the head only pushes the problem one step down. Perhaps
most important, absentee ownership is not possible in a horizontal hierarchy while it is in a vertical.
Therefore, if the sale of control does little to change the size of the vertical hierarchy there is no
incentive for the entrepreneur to sell because, given the imperfectly competitive nature of the
auction, she always gets more by retaining her stake.
We now discuss what our work implies for the dierence between organizations and markets.
VI. Markets and Organizations
What is the dierence between hierarchies (organizations) and markets in our model? We
follow Coase's [1937] depiction of the hierarchy as an entity where transactions are driven more by
authority or power than by prices. In our paper, the entrepreneur controls access to the critical
resource as well as access to the specialized human capital of the managers. In this sense, she has
some power. But managers are not powerless. In a vertical hierarchy, the specialized get positional
power, while in the horizontal hierarchy the specialized get (a chance at) the power from ownership.
This permits a distinction between those inside the organization (those who have access) and those
outside, as well as between those who have belonged for some time and have some power (the
specialized) and those who have just joined.
Many of these distinctions cannot be drawn in the Property Rights approach, the seminal work
of Grossman and Hart [1986] and Hart and Moore [1990] (GHM).25 That approach is essentially a
37static approach where the ownership of the critical resource and the legal right to make away with
it in the future gives the owner power. Since the Property Rights approach does not deem current
access necessary in any way (ownership is important only in that it helps control future access),
and the model is static, it does not help distinguish between people inside the organization and
people outside other than the owner(s).
There is another important distinction in our work. Organizations cannot exist in the Property
Rights framework if the legal rights of ownership cannot be enforced. This is why that framework
emphasizes physical assets (or alienable intangible ones like patents), as well as a well functioning
legal system, to explain organized activity like rms. But then what does one make of consulting
or law rms where the assets are largely human capital, or how can one explain the existence of
organizations in economies (or sectors) where property rights are not well enforced? This is where
the distinction between ownership (which gives the owner the right to determine access now and in
the future) and control (which only gives the right to determine current access) is important. As we
show, the ability to control access today may be enough to project control rights into the future, so a
whole gamut of unique resources that cannot be owned but can only be controlled, even temporarily,
oer similar residual rights as does ownership, and allow the emergence of organizations.26 This
distinction between the role of ownership and the role of control is very useful if we want to model
large corporations where ownership is separated from control.
The idea that the organizational core consists of unique capabilities and resources has become
crystallized in the Resource Based View of the rm (Penrose [1959], Wernerfelt [1984], Wernerfelt
and Montgomery [1988], Hamel and Prahalad [1990]). While the Resource Based View admits to a
greater variety of resources than does the Property Rights View, unlike our model it does not indi-
cate how these resources, especially intangible ones, provide authority around which organizations
can be built, or how they internally constrain organizational size.
38Finally, the superiority of organizations in our model does not rely on the permanent scarcity
of the critical resource. Organizational capabilities are built over time through specialization. In
particular, once the vertical hierarchy is built, even if the critical resource is no longer unique, the
hierarchy can produce more at that point than can a competing entrepreneur starting with a similar
resource even though technology does not constrain specialization or production possibilities. This
is because the web of specic investments built into the vertical hierarchy over time cannot be
reproduced instantaneously, through legal arrangement or by regulating access. This web could
also be termed its organizational capital (Klein [1988]).
VII. Conclusion: Is the Hierarchy a Firm?
At the core of our organization is a unique source of value, the critical resource, and three
mechanisms { access, specialization, and ownership { that tie agents to it. These mechanisms confer
on the organization a power of at which diers from ordinary market contracting. According to
Coase [1937], this is what distinguishes organizations from markets. Thus ours could be viewed as
an economic denition of an organization's boundaries.
The legal denition of the rm, however, is primarily in terms of ownership. Thus our notion
of organization sometimes diers from the legal denition. For instance, our theory can not only
encompass extra-legal organizations like the Maa, but also networks of \independent" rms such
as an automobile manufacturer and its dedicated suppliers. At the same time, entities the law
denes as a rm may not t our denition of an economic organization. For instance, a bond
trading group at an investment bank, tied to the bank only through its use of capital (which is
easily obtained elsewhere), is not really an integral economic part of the bank, though for all legal
and cash 
ow purposes, it is. The bank's headquarters has no real power over the group and, for
all practical purposes, trades at arm's length with it.27
39In our view, that our notion of economic organization does not fully overlap with the legal
denition of the rm is not a weakness of our theory. Instead, it points to inadequacies in the legal
denition. For instance, regulations such as anti-trust impose limitations on entities that belong
to a rm because it is believed they operate in a concerted manner, dierent from arm's length
interactions in a market. If entities that are not part of the same rm operate in a concerted
manner, there is no reason why regulations (and the law) should not treat them as a single rm.
By contrast, entities that are currently treated by the law as part of the same rm but operate at
arm's length should be treated dierently.
By distinguishing between an \economic" denition and a legal denition of the rm, we can
also understand the possible adverse eciency consequences of the current legal denition. For
example, the corporate opportunity doctrine restricts the ability of managers to personally take
advantage of opportunities that come to them while they are agents of the rm. Thus, there is a
strong incentive for organizations to conform to the legal denition of a rm so that they can enjoy
the protection the law gives them against opportunistic employees, even if this is not the optimal
form of organization from an economic perspective.
As physical assets become less important and give way to human capital, the boundaries of
the corporation dened in terms of the ownership of physical assets are becoming less meaningful.
It is becoming increasingly dicult to classify new hybrid entities such as EcoNets (keiretsu-type
alliances of internet rms) in traditional boxes. A deeper analysis of the economic nature of rms
is an necessary rst step in understanding and dealing with these new entities. We hope our model
represents a small move in this direction.
40Appendix
A. Derivation of manager k's payo
We prove this by induction.28 When k = n, (1) shows that (2) holds. Suppose (2) holds for
managers k + 1;:::n   1. All we need to show then is that it holds for manager k. It is easy to see
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The rst term in brackets is the payo remaining to be divided after managers below Mk have
taken their share, while the second term is the total output without Mk. Substituting from (2)
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Simplifying, we get (2).
B. To prove that in any position a specialized manager has less incentive to
compete than an unspecialized manager
To prove that in any position a specialized manager has less incentive to compete than an unspe-
cialized manager we need to write down the conditional IC constraints (the competition constraints
does not dier between the two).
The specialized manager's conditional IC constraint is
[1  

2n k+1]  k[(1  
1
2n k+1) + (1  

2n k+1) + 0(yk)]   cR: (13)
41The left hand side of (13) is the payo the specialized manager receives by working for an extra
period (his last one) in the rm. The right hand side is the present value of the payo he obtains
if he competes. When he competes, in the rst period he gets a rent for his human capital as the
head manager (producing with all his specialized subordinates) as well as a rent for his control
over the critical resource. After that he will get the present discounted value of the future rents
from the hierarchy because of his control of the resource, k0(yk). Discounted rent  is indexed
by O, the age of the manager when he replicates, because the age of the manager may aect the
development of the hierarchy in future periods. Also, future rents are a function of yk, the number
of specialized young managers who follow him. The number of specialized old managers who follow
him is irrelevant for future rents because they will all retire this period.
For an unspecialized manager in the kth position, the IC constraint is given by
[1  

2n k+1] + [1  

2ns h(ns;y0;yk)+1]   cS  k[(1  
1
2n k+1) + (1  

2n k+1) + Y (yk)]   cR; (14)
where ns is the length of the hierarchy next period if all managers specialize this period, and h is
the tier the manager will be placed in next period (which depends on the length of the hierarchy,
the number of managers in his cohort, y0, the number of unspecialized managers below him, yk).
Comparing the unspecialized manager's payo with the specialized manager's one we have:
i) regardless of the placement policy the left hand side of (13) is bigger than the l.h.s. of (14)
because of Assumption 1; ii) the right hand side of (14) is bigger than the r.h.s. of (13) because the
rst terms are equal and Y (yk) is greater than or equal to 0(yk) because the young competing
manager has the option to decide how to use his own human capital next period unlike an old
manager who has to retire.
42C. Proof that in case 2 the solution is bang-bang
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Let f be the objective function, g the constraint and L the Lagrange multiplier. Since we


























43 2 the objective function increases with . The terms containing n simplify
and this condition can be written as

[43   2][1  
1
2N ] + [43   3] + (23   1)
1
2N > 0; (19)
which corresponds to (4). Interestingly, (4) does not depend on . Thus, if (4) holds  = 1.
Otherwise,  = .
43D. Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 2





d3  0. 3 does not enter either the objective




d3  0, the IR constraint
requires d
d3  0.
Proof of Proposition 3
The left hand side of (4) is increasing in , hence,  can 
ip from  to 1  . Thus, (i) follows.
The comparative static for n
2 can be derived o inequality (16). Since the objective function
is increasing in  and n
2, we know that the constraint is binding. Thus, we can rewrite it as:
[1  

2n2 ] + [1  

2N ]   cS   3[(1  
1
2n2 ) + (1  

2n2 )]   3[(1  
1
2N ) + (1  

2N )] + cR = 0: (20)
For a given , an increase in 3 reduces the left hand side of (20), thus for the equality to hold
n
2 should drop, since the derivative of (20) with respect to n
2 is 
22log2(1 23) < 0: At the same
time, an increase in 3 leads to an increase in  because of (i). As before, in order for (20) to
hold n





2N ) < 0. Thus, (ii) follows from both the direct
and indirect eects of 3 on n
2.
Proof of Proposition 4
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Thus, the CIC is satised if n = n. This proves (ii).
Proof of Proposition 5














1 so that the head's CIC constraint is satised for any value of n, then there
is no need to reduce  further. So if  
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1 and nV = 1.
Proof of Corollary 1
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45Since the left hand side is a monotone function of n, we can derive the comparative statics on rm's
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Why the hybrid is not feasible.
To see why the hybrid is not feasible, let n be the cohort size. Then, the surplus the entrepreneur
splits equally with the head is what the head produces plus what they can extract from subordinate
managers, totalling 1 + n
2. Thus, the surplus a young incoming manager expects over his lifetime



















The expected surplus decreases in the number of managers in the cohort because the surplus
conditional on becoming head { which has a xed component { is divided among more candidates.
But this creates a problem. From (23), the expected surplus when n  2 is less than or equal to 1,
which by assumption 1 is less than the cost of specialization, cS. Since the hybrid requires at least
two managers in the second tier (else it is a vertical hierarchy), we have to conclude that it is not
feasible when rewards come solely through promotions.
46Other hybrids that involve a horizontal organization with vertical \divisions" provides worse
incentives than does a pure horizontal organization. A sketch of the intuition follows: Let a head
have ns subordinates in the second tier and let each of these have k subordinates in a vertical line
(for a total of k  ns + 1 managers in the hierarchy). Regardless of whether one of the second tier
is promoted or purchases control when the head retires, the managers who are subordinates of the
remaining n   1 managers in the second tier are red along with those managers. Now consider
the incentives of a manager at the bottom of the hierarchy. He gets 1
2 in the rst period, and has a
probability 1
n of being promoted by one rung in the second period and getting 3
4. With probability
n 1




4. Since n has to be at least 2 for
this to not be a vertical hierarchy, it is immediate that the expected rents are below 1 and hence
below cS.
Proof of Proposition 7
(Sketch) For  ! 1 and cR ! 0 the vertical hierarchy is infeasible when the entrepreneur is
inactive. Also when the entrepreneur is active the per-period entrepreneurial rent in the horizontal
hierarchy is always greater than the per-period rent in the vertical hierarchy. Thus, in the limit
the horizontal hierarchy is always preferred.
Therefore, all we need to show is that the entrepreneur's preference for the vertical hierarchy
is decreasing in  and increasing in cR. The incentive constraints in the vertical hierarchy become
tighter as  increases and cR decreases, while the incentive constraints for the horizontal hierarchy
remain unchanged provided that the entrepreneur can credibly promise to sell. But as  increases
and cR decreases the entrepreneur's incentive to sell also increases. Hence the proposition.
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52Notes 1 There is a large literature that discusses this problem (see, for example, Williamson [1975], Cheung [1982],
Landes [1986], Liebeskind [1996], Rumelt [1987], Teece [1986], Mailath and Postelwaite [1990], and Rebitzer and
Taylor [1997]). Teece [1986] proposes that a rm mitigates expropriation by owning a set of complementary assets
that are critical to production while Rebitzer and Taylor [1997] argue that law rms reward those with the highest
threat of expropriation with higher rents.
2After breaking away, each manager produces 0:49. Pietro gets half of what Ram produces for a total of 0:491:5
each period.
3In this example we assume that managers have a horizon of only two periods and that the cost of expropriating
the technology is zero. Both assumptions are relaxed in the model.
4Examples of technology-based theories of the rm include Lucas [1978], Rosen [1982], Bolton and Dewatripont
[1994], and Garicano [1998].
5While it is fairly uncontroversial that the entrepreneur can oer or refuse access to one manager, it is more
questionable whether she has the ability to regulate access further down the hierachy. We have proven similar results
under the assumption that the entrepreneur oers direct access only to one manager, who chooses his subordinate
among the pool of managers with access, and so on. Our notion that the entrepreneur allocates access is similar in
many ways to the notion in Holmstrom [1999], Holmstrom and Milgrom [1994] (particularly in their focus on the
allocation of tasks) and in Holmstrom and Roberts [1998] that the rm is a closed system that can allocate incentives
without being pressured by the market.
6This is because access is short form for a broad category of memberships, delegated control rights and task
assignments that are very hard for the entrepreneur to specify precisely, and for courts to enforce. In the language
of Grossman and Hart [1986], the right to control access is a \residual" right of control that emanates from control
(though not necessarily ownership) of the resource. However, under some circumstances we do allow the resource to
be alienable (see later), and thus the right to control access can be sold.
7In an earlier version of the paper, we assumed managers specialized to the technology only, and not to their
superior. The results were similar to the ones in this paper. In practice, specialization contains an element of
specialization to a technology and specialization to surrounding humans, which we hope to capture with the current
assumption.
8Setting up as competition should also be viewed as a metaphor for all those activities that allow managers to
appropriate part of the value of the rm. Thus, while in large organizations it is rare to see top managers departing
with all their subordinates, is quite common to see them use their control of their subordinates to capture more
53rents from the rm. Thus the basic trade-o {of increasing access so as to increase productive eciency, and limiting
access to reduce the transfer of power { will continue to play an important role in determining the structure and
growth of large organizations.
9This cost is more than just the eort cost of collecting the information about the resource, the psychic costs
of sneaking it away or the reputational costs of being deemed disloyal. It includes the expected legal costs of any
law suits the entrepreneur might le, and the added risks and stress of becoming an entrepreneur. For a capital
intensive technology, it could include the dead weight cost of raising nance to fund the new enterprise, a cost
which would increase with the degree of imperfections in the capital markets. In a family run rm, it includes the
social sanctions the family may impose for defying the family patriarch. Finally, in the spirit of Hansmann [1996]
(also see Alchian and Demsetz [1972], Jensen and Meckling [1976], Williamson (1975,1985)) it could be the costs of
reproducing interdependent contracts with the members of the production team. Taken together, these costs can be
substantial.
10The manager does not have the resource, so he cannot produce with his subordinates. The reservation wage,
which we will describe momentarily, is public information. This ensures that bargaining will be ecient, making it
more dicult to achieve a stable rm. This is unlike Mailath and Postelwaite [1990] who show that when workers'
reservation value is unobservable, workers will not leave a rm because they cannot agree on how to split the future
surplus arising from their joint departure.
11Since access is not contractible, superiors cannot commit to include or exclude the manager next period, neither
can the latter commit to work. Moreover, whether or not production takes place this period has no bearing on
whether production can take place next period. So next period's possibilities have no eect on the bargaining.
12We are certainly not the rst to note that positions that are the only \connections" to other positions are a
source of power. This is explored in Granovetter [1984] and Burt [1992]
13The only important property of the bargaining outcome is that a manager's rent increases with his position.
This would be true, for example, if we assume that each manager gets the Shapley value. There are two reasons
why we chose not to use the the Shapley value in this context. First, it assumes, somewhat implausibly that each
manager has an equal right to make oers independent of his position in the hierarchy. Second, the expression for
the manager's rent is not recursive, increasing signicantly the computational burden.
14While in reality, compensation can be committed to over short periods like a year, compensation over longer
periods like decades, which approximate the duration of a period in our model, is hard to commit to. Compensation
also cannot be made contingent on specialization, which is hard to verify.
5415By assumption 2, 2 (n
0
1 + n2) > 1 whenever n
0
1 + n2  2. Since n
0
1  1 if there is at least one old manager and
n2  1 when at least one manager is hired at date 2 (which is necessary for the hierarchy to survive into the next
period), n
0
1 + n2  2 and the manager will defeat the entrepreneur if he competes.






+n2 k+1log2(1   2k), which is negative by assumption 2.
17The lowest young manager today is placed over all the young next period, hence his incentive to specialize
increases in the number of young next period. The number of young increase between the rst and second period
because there are trivially more specialized managers at date 2 than at date 1 when there are zero. They increase
between the second and third period because N is large. In general, the number of young will always increase in
every period except possibly the one in which the steady state is reached.
18In a steady state with no competition, this implies that the size of the entering cohort is constant. An alternative
denition of steady state would be an equilibrium where the size of the hierarchy remains constant, but the size of
the entering cohort oscillates (an overlapping generations model allows the hierarchy size to be constant with the
entering cohort being the same size only every two periods). It is easy to prove that for every equilibrium where
the entering cohort size changes between periods, there is an equilibrium where the cohort size is constant and the
hierarchy at least as long. Thus, our focus on steady states with constant entering cohort size is without any loss of
generality.
19Since   1 and n2 > 2, nt  nt 1 > 2 for t > 2. If n2 > 2, it must be that
2
2 > 3, so that 2 <
2
3. Since
k  2 for k > 2, we have on substituting into (6) that nt  Int[
3
2  nt 1] > nt 1 since nt 1 > 2.
20The extent to which one can rely on family and friends also depend on the level of trust prevailing in a society.
This might explain the nding of La Porta et al. [1997], that large rms are more important in countries with a
higher level of trust.
21This resembles Marglin's [1984] idea that the organization is imposed by the capitalist to make himself essential
to the production process on a continuing basis. But the horizontal hierarchy in our framework is not so much a tool
for exploitation as a device to prevent expropriation.
22Each manager has a probability
(n 1)!
(n+1)! of immediately following the seller and being pivotal to the creation of
surplus S.
23The entrepreneur would continue to choose  = 1 at the outset if 
 is low or the feasible cohort size n is relatively
large.
24Kahn and Huberman [1988] oer a dierent explanation; an up or out policy emerges as an optimal mechanism to
55prevent rms from reneging on compensation to workers. Good workers cannot be labeled \bad" and not promoted
because they have to be red, at some cost to the rm.
25 More recently, however, Hart and Moore [1999] depart from this approach by examining the ex ante allocation
of access to tasks, an analysis closer in spirit to ours though with a dierent focus.
26While the ability to sell possession is essential to provide incentives in a horizontal hierarchy when  = 1, the
ability derived from law to enforce future exclusion is not an essential feature of the resource. So, for example, a
lawyer could \sell" his clients by introducing the purchaser to all of them and then take retirement. Another way of
describing the general point is that formal authority (see Aghion and Tirole [1997]) that typically is thought of as
deriving from legal constructs like ownership may, in fact, emerge from more informal past processes.
27In this, our views are similar to Baker, Gibbons and Murphy [1997] who see a continuum of structures between
the rm and the market.
28Thanks to Heitor Almeida for suggesting a more illuminating exposition of this proof.
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